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“This book is not a suicide note” Simon Critchley reassures us at the start of Notes on 
Suicide. Instead he proposes to “look at suicide closely, carefully, and perhaps a little 
coldly”. Yet four pages later we are told, abruptly, that Critchley’s interest in suicide 
isn’t “remotely” academic. For reasons “we don’t need to go into” (don’t we?), 
Critchley’s life has “dissolved over the past year or so, like sugar in hot tea.” (In 2013 
Critchley and his psychoanalyst wife Jamieson Webster published The Hamlet 
Doctrine, a meditation on the incapacity to love; they separated soon after. It isn’t 
made clear what this has to do with that, though we do learn that Webster once 
wrote a fake suicide note that read “Dear Simon, Break a leg, or all your legs”, which 
she signed “with all my love-hate, Jamieson”.) Instead of a theoretical way into 
suicide Critchley says he wants to find a practical way out of it, to rid himself of 
“fantasies of self-destruction…motivated by self-pity, self-loathing and revenge”. He 
explains that the book is being written in a hotel room in East Anglia, where he 
came from New York to “meet the darkness in the darkness, at the end of the 
land…the vast, the unlimited”. 
 
It’s bad form to question the sincerity of someone’s suicidal ideation, but one can’t 
help it with Critchley. His motivation might not be academic, but Notes On Suicide is 
more of a philosophical essay than a felt reckoning with the prospect of taking one’s 
own life. In this it feels like the Meditations, the cold North Sea replacing Descartes’ 
warming fire, death replacing doubt: a crisis staged for the reader’s benefit, with 
nothing really hanging in the balance. Surely no one who has seriously contemplated 
suicide could question whether there might be good reasons for killing oneself. Yet 
Critchley begins his essay by making heavy weather of both arguments for and 
against suicide’s permissibility, claiming they all face insurmountable problems. We 
have a duty to God, some say, not to kill ourselves – or, in a more secular register, a 
duty to our families – but what if we’re miserable? We have the right to take our 
own lives, some say, but doesn’t this ignore the legitimate claims others have on us? 
Why not simply say: other people might have legitimate claims on our lives, but 
sometimes those claims are trumped by more pressing considerations: unbearable 
pain, indignity, a political cause? Like other drastic actions – quitting a job, ending a 
marriage – suicide isn’t a decision to be made lightly, but to seriously ponder 
whether it’s ever reasonable is to forget what torture life (or work, or marriage) can 
be. 
 
Critchley is convinced this is a minority view, and that most of us remain in the grip 
of a Christian metaphysics that sees suicide as an absolute wrong. Could he be right? 
Assisted suicide might remain controversial, but ordinary suicide is legal throughout 
Europe. (Criminalising suicide raises the problem of how you punish a dead person; 
Blackstone’s neat solution was to ditch the corpse in the highway with a stake driven 
through it.) Even the recent debates in Parliament about the assisted dying bill 
didn’t refer much to the inviolable sanctity of life, but rather to the reasonable (if 
ultimately unconvincing) worry that the law would encourage vulnerable people to 
die for bad reasons. The bill failed, but that’s at odds with the mood of the country; a 
2010 survey suggests that 82% of the British public supports medically assisted 
dying for terminally ill patients, and the number only drops to 71% amongst 
religious people. Is Critchley right that we abhor suicide? Or do we just mourn those 
who kill themselves when there was still succour to be found? 
 
When Critchley turns from abstraction to real cases of suicide he finds no dearth of 
understandable motivations: desperation, revenge, boredom, economics. Most 
interesting is the suicide that heeds Seneca’s dictum that the wise man “lives as long 
as he ought, not as long as he can”. George Eastman, founder of Eastman Kodak, 
shot himself in the heart, leaving behind the note: “To my friends: my work is done. 
Why wait?” Hunter S. Thompson apparently felt that late was better than never: 
“67. 17 years past 50. 17 more than I needed or wanted. Boring…67, you are getting 
greedy. Act your old age. Relax. This won’t hurt.” Critchley admires this sort of end, 
sober and un-entitled. But he is attracted most of all to suicide done for no apparent 
reason, as a leap into the absurd. He quotes approvingly from Edouard Levé’s novel 
Suicide (Levé turned in the manuscript ten days before hanging himself): “Your 
death was scandalously beautiful”. 
 
Critchley’s ultimate refutation of the absurdist case for suicide is that suicide is too 
positive an act: if nothing means anything, then why do anything at all, let alone kill 
yourself? Why not meet the world, instead, with indifference – or love? But here 
Critchley betrays the casual nihilism he wishes to affect. Love isn’t something we 
might as well embrace because life is pointless, but one of the things that gives life, 
when it has one, its point. To think otherwise is to indulge an adolescent fantasy of 
suicide, one that not only obscures the real terrors that drive many people to it, but 
also the real goods they thereby, often knowingly, forsake. For Freud the mystery of 
suicide – how the self-loving ego could destroy itself – had its solution in hate: the 
melancholic comes to see herself as a mere object of loathing; the self as subject is 
destroyed, almost incidentally, along the way. But many suicide notes are also love 
notes, as if the anticipation of acting out one’s self-hatred frees one to love more 
fully, finally. Kurt Cobain, in his suicide note, described how he had become “hateful 
toward all humans in general” before scrawling in large letters at the bottom of the 
page: “I LOVE YOU! I LOVE YOU!” 
